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Abstract
This paper contains three important contributions to the literature on international migrations.
First, it compiles a new dataset on migration flows and stocks and on immigration laws for 14
OECD destination countries and 74 sending countries for each year over the period 1980-2005.
Second, it extends the empirical model of migration choice across multiple destinations,
developed by Grogger and Hanson (2008), by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity
between migrants and non-migrants. We use the model to derive a pseudo-gravity empirical
specification of the economic and legal determinants of international migration. Our estimates
show that bilateral migration flows are increasing in the income per capita gap between origin
and destination. We also find that bilateral flows decrease significantly when the destination
countries adopt stricter immigration laws. Third, we estimate the impact of immigration flows on
employment, investment and productivity in the receiving OECD countries using as instruments
the ”push” factors only in the gravity equation. We find that immigration increases employment
one for one, implying no crowding-out of natives. In addition, investment responds rapidly and
vigorously, and total factor productivity is not affected. These results imply that immigration
increases the total GDP of the receiving country in the short-run one-for-one, without affecting
average wages or labor productivity. We also find that the effects of immigration are less
beneficial when the receiving economy is in bad economic times.
Keywords: International Migration, Push and Pull factors, Migration costs, Employment,
Investment, Productivity.
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that
presented in Human Development Reports.
1 Introduction
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature on international migration that, so far, have evolved
separately. One analyzes the determinants of international migrations (mostly by international economists) and
the other analyzes the impact of immigration on the receiving countries (mostly by labor economists).
We make three contributions to the literature on the determinants of international migration flows. The first
contribution is in terms of data. Building on Mayda (forthcoming), we extend the existing datasets on bilateral
migration flows (gross and net) and stocks to more countries (14 OECD destinations and 74 countries of origin)
and years (1980-2005).1 More importantly, we build several new measures of immigration policy for the same 14
OECD destination countries. Specifically, we provide quantitative measures of immigration policy restrictions
(or tightness) along several dimensions. Following some mechanical rules and by reading carefully the content
of a few hundred laws we classify them based on whether they tighten the requirements of entry or stay in the
country, separating laws that concern asylum seekers from laws dealing with other types of immigrants.
Secondly, we extend the empirical model of utility-maximizing migration choices in Grogger and Hanson
(2008) by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity.2 We use this model to derive a pseudo-gravity
equation where bilateral migration flows are determined by income gaps between origin and destination, a num-
ber of measures of geographic and cultural distance, immigration policy tightness in the destination countries,
and a comprehensive measure of push factors. As we explain below, the subset of variables that are exogenous to
economic conditions in the destination will be the key to our identification of the main eﬀects of immigration on
receiving economies. Our empirical specification is consistent with several discrete-choice models (multinomial
logit and nested logit).
Third, our richer specification of the pseudo-gravity equation allows us to control for a very large set of fixed
eﬀects, and to better identify the eﬀects of income gaps between origin and destination on the size of bilateral
migration flows. In addition, we provide estimates of the eﬀects of a tightening of immigration policy in a
country on the size of the inflows it receives.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the aggregate eﬀects of immigration on receiving economies.
While the recent literature on the impact of immigrants on labor markets (Borjas and Katz 2007, Ottaviano
and Peri 2008) acknowledges that the country is the appropriate unit with which to analyze such eﬀects (due
to the high degree of mobility of workers within it) there are extremely few cross-country (or panel) studies of
those eﬀects. The main reason is the diﬃculty in obtaining variation in immigration flows that is exogenous
to economic conditions in the destination country. In this paper we compile consistent annual data for our 14
1Mayda (forthcoming) uses data from the OECD international migration statistics. These data were discontinued in 1994. For
the period 1995-2005 they have been substituted with a new database on immigration flows and stocks in OECD countries (publicly
available at http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode=MIG).
2Grogger and Hanson (2008) disaggregate migration flows by education but we do not.
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destination countries from several OECD sources on employment and hours, income, and capital services for
the period 1980-2005. Most importantly, we propose a new identification strategy on the eﬀects of immigration.
Specifically, we use our estimates of the determinants of bilateral migration flows to build a predictor that
relies exclusively on push factors, that is, we only employ the variation that is specific to the country of origin and
to bilateral time-invariant migration costs. For a given country of origin, there is variation across destinations
arising from diﬀerences in bilateral migration costs (due to geography, culture or networks) that is exogenous
to economic conditions in the destination countries. For instance, a boom in emigrants from Poland due to the
opening of its border is more likely to generate large migration to Germany than to Canada (for geographical and
historical reasons), while a boom of emigrants from the Philippines is more likely to generate large immigration
to Japan (proximity) and the US (previous networks) than to France. Using such push-driven flows we track
their eﬀects on the employment, capital and productivity of the receiving countries.
Using an instrumental variables strategy, we provide causal estimates of the eﬀects of immigration on em-
ployment and hours, capital, total factor productivity, and income. In our estimation we allow immigration to
have diﬀerent eﬀects depending on the business cycle of the receiving country. In particular, we diﬀerentiate
between normal and bad economic times, defined as periods with a sizeable output gap.
The paper has three main findings. First, confirming previous literature (e.g. Mayda, forthcoming), our
regressions consistently show that diﬀerences in the level of income per person between the destination and
origin country have a positive and significant eﬀect on bilateral migration flows. An increase in the gap by
1000 PPP$ (in 2000 prices) increases bilateral migration flows by about 10% of their initial value. Also, we
find that stricter entry laws significantly discourage immigration. Each reform which introduced tighter rules of
entry for immigrants decreased immigration flows by 6% to 10%.Second, we find that time-varying push factors
specific to countries of origin and interacted with bilateral fixed costs of migration, predict a significant share
(around 40%) of the variation in migration to the OECD receiving countries. Such variation of immigration
flows for a receiving country over time can legitimately be consider as ”exogenous” to the economic, political and
demographic conditions of the receiving country. In other words, we have an instrument that is both exogenous
and highly relevant. Third, we find that an “exogenous” inflow of immigrants increases employment and hours
worked, the capital stock, and income one for one in the year of arrival. These eﬀects are consistent with an
increase in the labor supply in the neoclassical growth model assuming that investment responds quickly, or
that immigration triggers capital flows into the country (as argued in Lange and Gollin, 2008). We also note
that usually immigration flows are relatively small, only a fraction of a percentage point of the labor force
of the receiving country, and easily predictable. Thus, a full and rapid reaction in the stock of capital seems
reasonable.
We also provide separate estimates of the eﬀects of immigration in normal and in ”bad economic times” for
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the destination country (i.e. when there is a sizeable output gap). We find that in bad times, possibly due
to weak demand, the economy is unable to expand employment by the full size of immigration. According to
our estimates, the arrival of 10 additional immigrants leads approximately to an increase in employment equal
to 9. Consequently, ten percent of the inflow remains unemployed or, alternatively, some native workers are
crowded out. The response of capital is also smaller in bad times and, as a result, the income elasticity of an
immigration shock is also lower than in normal times. However, even in bad times, immigration does not reduce
the capital-labor ratio.
Overall, our results suggest that immigration has no eﬀects on average wages or on the return to capital in
the receiving countries. It simply leads to an increase in total employment and a proportional response of GDP,
even during bad economic times.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 derives the empirical model of bilateral migration flows and presents our estimates of the eﬀect
of income diﬀerences (between sending and receiving country) and immigration laws (in destination countries)
on bilateral flows. Section 5 estimates the aggregate economic eﬀects of immigration. Section 6 discusses the
main implications of our findings and provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to the literature on the determinants of international migration flows. Gravity regressions
have become very popular in analyzing trade flows (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003, Chaney 2008 and Help-
man, Melitz and Rubinstein, forthcoming) primarily because they can be derived from an equilibrium model
with optimizing firms. However, the literature on international migration flows has lagged behind. A large part
of the literature on migration flows had previously estimated a gravity or ”pseudo-gravity” equations between
many origins and one single destination (e.g. Clark et al 2008, Karemera et al 2000, Pedersen et al 2004, and
Garcia-Gomez and Lopez-Casasnovas 2006). Moreover, their specifications were unrelated to any theory of
individual maximizing choices. Other papers have derived predictions on the selection of migrants from a Roy
model and estimated only some of its implications (Borjas 1987, Dahl 2002).
Recently, Grogger and Hanson (2008) have analyzed the scale, selection and sorting across destinations of
migrants with diﬀerent education levels using a model based on optimal migration choices. Their contribution
is part-way between the theory of optimal choice and an empirical, pseudo-gravity equation. In particular, their
specification for the ”scale” of migration uses as the dependent variable the diﬀerence between the logs of the
odds of migrating to a specific country and the odds of not migrating at all. Their analysis disaggregates flows
by education. Building on their work, we derive a model (for one type of labor but allowing for unobserved
individual heterogeneity) that delivers an equation in which the log of bilateral migration (stocks or flows) is a
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function of sending and receiving country eﬀects, expected income diﬀerentials and migration costs. Estimation
of our model only requires bilateral data on migration flows (or stocks), but no data on the population of
the country of origin. Our empirical specification allows us to focus on the determinants of migration in the
destination countries (while fully controlling for any factor depending on country of origin and year). We also
make a contribution to the small literature on the eﬀects of immigration laws on immigration flows. Important
contributions to this literature are Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) and Mayda (forthcoming).3
Our paper is also related to the literature that analyzes the economic eﬀects of immigration on receiving
countries. Most existing papers focus on labor market implications and on one or only a few receiving countries
(e.g. Aydemir and Borjas 2007, Borjas 2003, Ottaviano and Peri 2008, Manacorda et al. 2006). Angrist and
Kugler (2005) use a panel of European countries and analyze the labor market eﬀects of immigration. This
paper is also related to the recent work by Peri (2008) and Ortega (2008b). These studies adopt a more general
perspective by estimating the eﬀects of immigration on employment, capital accumulation and productivity.
However, the analysis is limited to regional economies.4
3 Data
This section describes the data that are novel to this paper, namely those on yearly migration flows into 14
OECD countries over the period 1980-2005 and those on immigration laws and reforms in the same countries
over the same period.
3.1 Migration Flows
The data on yearly migration flows come from the International Migration Dataset (IMD) provided by the
OECD. Data for the period 1980-1995 relative to 14 OECD destination countries and for close to 80 countries
of origin were collected and organized by Mayda (forthcoming)5. We merged these data with the new data
relative to the period 1995-2005 for 25 OECD receiving countries and more than one hundred sending countries,
available at OECD (2007). The data for the two periods should be perfectly consistent as the source and
method of collection are the same. The older data (1980-1995) however are no longer publicly available from
the OECD. In order to obtain a balanced and consistent panel we select 14 OECD destination countries6 and 74
countries of origin (listed in table A1 of the Appendix). The data on migration flows collected in the IMD are
3See also Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008) for a historical analysis of the eﬀects of institutions on migration flows for a reduced
number of countries.
4As far as we know, there are no estimates in the literature on the eﬀects of immigration on total employment, capital accumu-
lation or productivity at the country level that can be given a causal interpretation.
5We refer to Mayda (forthcoming) for specific descriptions of the data relative to the 1980-1995 period. The source (OECD
International Migration Data) and the definitions, however, are the same as those provided by the OECD for the statistics relative
to the 1995-2005 period. Hence, we simply merged the two series.
6Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
and USA.
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based on national statistics, gathered and homogenized by the OECD statistical oﬃce7. The national data are
based on population registers or residence permits. In both cases these are considered to be accurate measures
of the entry of legal foreign nationals. We consider the data relative to the total inflow of foreign persons,
independently of the reason (immigration, temporary or asylum). While the OECD makes an eﬀort (especially
since 1995) to maintain a consistent definition of immigrants across countries, there are some diﬀerences between
destination country definitions. An important one is that some countries define immigrants on the basis of the
place of birth, and others on the basis of nationality. While this inconsistency can make a pure cross-country
comparison inaccurate, our analysis focuses on changes within destination countries over time. Therefore it
should be exempt from large mis-measurement due to the classification problem.
The total inflow of foreign persons each year for each country of destination, as measured by these OECD
sources, constitutes what we call total gross immigration. We also construct a measure of total net immigration
and a measure of the stock of immigrants for each receiving country and year. In these two measures we try to
correct for the outflow of foreign persons, due to re-migration or return migration and we combine the flow data
with a diﬀerent data set on the stock of migrants in each of the 14 OECD countries. 8 The re-migration flows,
however, are harder to measure as people are not required to communicate to the registry of population their
intention to leave the country. Hence we infer the net immigration flows using the gross immigration data and
the data on immigrant stocks (by country of origin) from Docquier (2007) for 29 OECD countries in years around
1990 and around 2000. The data on stocks of immigrants by country of origin collected by Docquier (2007)
use as sources the censuses of the receiving countries rather than population registers. Hence those data come
from a diﬀerent source than flow data, should include the undocumented immigrants and are the basis for the
calculation of net flows and updated stocks each year for 1980-2005. For each of our 14 countries of destination
we know the yearly inflow and the stock circa years 1990 and 2000. For each receiving country we impute a
yearly out-migration rate of the stock of immigrants that, using the stock in 1990 and the measured yearly
flows between 1990 and 2000, would produce the measured stock in 20009. We apply this constant, destination-
specific, re-migration rate to all years and obtain the stock of immigrants each year (between 1980 and 2005)
and the net immigration rates each year. Panel A1 in the Appendix reports the gross and net immigration rates
(i.e. immigration flows as a percentage of the population at the beginning of the year) for our 14 destination
countries over the 25 years considered. For most countries gross and net immigration rates are similar and
move together over time. We note that our net immigration rates are probably much less precise than our
measures of gross immigration. Recall that we assumed constant re-migration rates for all years, while gross
7More details on the immigration data and their construction is provided in Appendix A.
8This phenomenon can be significant—depending on the country, we estimate that every year between 0.5 and 10% of the existing
stock of migrants will migrate out.
9This procedure is like finding the unknown ”depreciation rate” when we have a measure of a stock variable in 1990 and 2000
and a measure of yearly flows between them.
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immigration flows and re-migration rates are likely to be correlated10. Second, any diﬀerence between stocks
and flows could also be due to undocumented immigration, their somewhat diﬀerent classification systems, or
other discrepancies, rather than to re-migration only. Third, for some countries the implied re-migration rate
is extremely high and not very plausible11. Hence, while we will use the net immigration flows to check some
regression results (see Table 3 and 5) the preferred specifications which analyze the impact of immigration
on the receiving economy will be based on gross inflows of immigrants. At the same time checking that our
main results on the determinants of migration are consistent when using stocks or, alternatively, flows provide
confidence in their validity.
A preliminary look at Panel 1 reveals two facts. First, immigration rates have displayed an increasing trend
in many countries but for some countries, such as the US and Germany, they peaked in the middle of the period
(corresponding to the regularization of the late 1980s for the US and to immigration from the East in the early
1990s in Germany). Therefore it is hard to establish a common trend of immigration flows over time. Second,
there is a lot of idiosyncratic fluctuation in immigration rates across countries. Hence, in principle, the variation
within country over time is large enough (and independent across countries) to allow us to identify the eﬀects of
immigration on employment, capital accumulation and TFP. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the summary
statistics and the data sources for the other economic and demographic variables in the empirical analysis. Note
that the average GDP per person was more than double in the receiving countries relative to the countries of
origin in each year; furthermore, the employment rate was also consistently higher and income inequality (Gini
coeﬃcient) consistently lower in the countries of destination. Countries of destination also typically had a lower
share of young persons in their population, reflecting the fact that most international migration is by young
workers from countries where they are abundant to countries where young workers are scarce.12
3.2 Immigration Laws
There has been a growing interest on the determinants of immigration policy since the seminal paper by
Benhabib (1996).13 This literature has remained mostly theoretical due to the unavailability of measures of
immigration policy that could be used for empirical purposes.14 An important contribution of this paper is the
updating of a database on immigration laws for the 14 OECD countries in our sample and the codification of
a method to identify an immigration reform as increasing (+1) or decreasing (-1) the tightness of immigration
laws. The starting point for the database is the laws collected by Mayda and Patel (2004) and the Social Reforms
10Coen-Pirani (2008) analyzes migration flows across US states. He finds that gross inflow and outflow rates are strongly,
positively correlated.
11Appendix A reports the calibrated re-migration rates for each country of destination.
12The other variables used in the bilateral regressions are Log Distance, Border, Common Language and Colony dummies and
are taken from Glick and Rose (2001).
13Some important contributions are Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004), Ortega (2005, 2008a), and Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008).
14An exception is the already mentioned work by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) on the evolution of citizenship laws.
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database of the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti , FRDB, (2007). Mayda and Patel (2004) documented the
main characteristics of the migration policies of several OECD countries (between 1980 and 2000) and the year
of changes in their legislations. The FRDB Social Reforms Database collects information about social reforms
in the EU15 Countries (except Luxembourg) over the period 1987-2005.
We merged and updated these two datasets obtaining the complete set of immigration reforms in the period
1980-2005 relative to all the 14 OECD countries considered, for a total of more than 240 laws. The list of
immigration laws by country and year and a brief description of what each of them accomplished can be
found in the ”Immigration Reform Appendix” to the paper15. We then constructed three separate indices of
”tightness” for every reform mentioned in the database. The first index includes only those measures tightening
or loosening the ”entry” of non-asylum immigrants. The second is a more comprehensive index that includes
measures tightening or relaxing provisions concerning the entry and/or the stay of non-asylum immigrants.
The third is an index that includes changes in immigration policy concerning the entry and/or the stay of
asylum seekers only. In general, we consider as ”loosening” entry laws (implying a change in the tightness
variable of -1) those reforms that (i) lower requirements, fees or documents for entry and to obtain residence
or work permits or (ii) introduce the possibility or increase the number of temporary permits. We consider
as a loosening in stay laws those legal changes that (iii) reduce the number of years to obtain a permanent
residence permit and those that (iv) foster the social integration of immigrants. On the other hand, a reform
is considered as tightening entry laws (+1 in the variable capturing tightness of entry) if (i) it introduces or
decreases quotas for entry, and (ii) increases requirements, fees or documents for entry and to obtain residence
or work permits. It is considered as tightening the stay-laws if (iii) it raises the number of years to obtain
a permanent residence permit/citizenship or (iv) it introduces residence constraints. We also apply the same
definitions for the tightening of entry and stay to asylum seekers in order to produce tightness variables for this
group. In spite of these rules there are several reforms that do not explicitly fit any of the categories above. In
those cases we classified them as ”loosening” or ”tightening”, or no change, by scrutinizing the content of each
regulation. 16
Panel A2 in the Appendix plots the variables for immigration policy tightening with respect to entry for
immigrants (solid lines) and asylum seekers (dashed lines) for each of the 14 countries of destination. The initial
value of each variable in each country is 0. Hence the variables only capture the variation in laws over time
within a country. In the regressions which include the bilateral migration flows we always include a country of
destination eﬀect which captures initial cross-country diﬀerences in tightness of immigration laws. A preliminary
inspection of the variables reveals that countries such as Australia, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and Canada
15Available at the website:
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gperi/Papers/immigration reform appendix.pdf
16Three research assistants read the laws and provided us with a brief summary of each law. These summaries were read by the
two authors and discussed until converging on the sign of the policy change.
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significantly loosened their entry laws beginning around 1990, (with less of a change for their asylum laws).
Denmark and Japan tightened their entry laws. The US loosened its immigration policy regarding entry during
the eighties and nineties and tightened policy beginning around 2000. The remaining countries did not change
the tightness of their immigration policies regarding entry very much. As it is hard to detect any clear correlation
between the change in laws over time and the change in immigration flows, we move to more formal regression
analyses of the determinants of bilateral migration flows, basing the estimating equation on a simple theory of
the discrete choices of migrants.
4 Determinants of Immigration
This section presents a model of migration choice across multiple locations and derives an estimating equation
from the model. Our estimating equation is consistent both with a simple logit model (McFadden, 1974) as
well as with a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978). Our migration model extends Grogger and Hanson (2007,
2008) by allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. It is plausible
that migrants systematically diﬀer from non-migrants along important dimensions that are hard to measure,
such as ability, risk aversion, or the psychological costs of living far from home. An additional attractive feature
of our empirical specification is that it is reminiscent of a generalized gravity equation in which the logarithm
of bilateral migration flows is a function of origin and destination country fixed eﬀects and bilateral migration
costs.
4.1 Migration model
Following Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008), we study the problem of a potential migrant that makes a utility-
maximizing migration decision among multiple destinations. Agent i, in country of origin o ∈ O, decides whether
to stay in o or to migrate to any of d ∈ D = {1, ...,D} potential destination countries.
The utility from a given destination d depends on the potential migrant’s expected permanent value of labor
income in that country and on the costs associated with migrating to d. Specifically, individual i’s utility (net
of costs) associated with migrating from country of origin o to country d is given by:
Uodi = δod − vodi = f(W d)− g(Cod)− vodi, (1)
where δod is a country-pair-specific term shared by all individuals migrating from the same origin to the
same destination, and viod is individual-specific. In particular, the termW d is the permanent expected earnings
of individual i in country d and Cod is the cost of migration, which may include destination-specific terms and
bilateral costs that vary by country pair.
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We assume separability between costs and benefits of migration. We also assume that the average expected
labor income in the country of destination W d can be decomposed into the product of the probability of
employment in that country (pd) times the average wage when employed (Wd). We explicitly allow migration
costs to depend on specific destination country factors θd (such as immigration laws), and on specific bilateral
country factors Xod (such as geographical or cultural distance). We normalize the average expected utility from
not migrating (remaining in o) f1(poWo) to zero. Obviously, migration costs are zero for individuals that choose
to stay in the country of origin.
We also assume that f and g are increasing functions. If these functions are approximately linear, we can
interpret them as monetary costs that reduce expected income. If f and g are better approximated by logarithmic
functions then migration costs can be viewed as time costs, which can be subtracted from log real wages.
Grogger and Hanson (2008) argue that their estimation results are inconsistent with utility maximization under
logarithmic f and g, implying that the logarithmic model is mis-specified and produces omitted variable bias17.
To keep our estimates comparable to theirs we proceed by assuming that functions f and g are approximately
linear. Hence, we can write (1) as:
Uodi = f1(pdWd)− g1θd − g2βXod − νodi, (2)
where f1 and gi are positive constants.
The idiosyncratic term νodi captures any other individual, unobservable characteristics that are important to
migration decisions. There is substantial evidence suggesting that migrants and non-migrants are systematically
diﬀerent in important dimensions. For example, it is plausible to expect migrants to have higher ability, lower
risk aversion, or lower psychological costs from being in a foreign country than non-migrants from the same
country of origin. A convenient way to capture these diﬀerences is by adapting the nested logit discrete-choice
model first proposed in McFadden (1978) to our problem. Specifically, we follow the rendition by Cardell (1991)
and Berry (1994), which frame the nested logit model in the language of the random coeﬃcients model. Let
νodi = (1− σ)εiod, for d = o (3)
νodi = ζi + (1− σ)εiod, for d ∈ D, (4)
where εiod is iid following a (Weibull) extreme value distribution, and ζi is an individual-specific term that
aﬀects migrants only, and its distribution depends on σ ∈ [0, 1). As shown by Cardell (1991), νodi has an
17Our empirical specification is much richer, in terms of fixed eﬀects, than the one used by Grogger and Hanson (2008). Hence,
we do not expect such a large bias from the log utility model. This is confirmed by the fact that our linear and logarithmic estimates
(see Table 1) are not too diﬀerent.
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extreme value distribution as well. Two points are worth noting. First, we note that term ζi is individual-
specific but constant across all possible destinations. Thus, it can be interpreted as diﬀerences in preferences for
migration. Second, this model nests the standard logit model used in Grogger and Hanson (2007, 2008) when
we set σ = 0.18
Utility maximization under our distributional assumptions delivers a neat way to identify the utility (net
of costs) associated with migration decisions from data on the proportion of individuals that migrate to each
destination, or choose to stay in the country of origin. Namely,
ln sod − ln soo − σ ln sdD = f1W d − g1θd − g2βXod, (5)
where sod = nod/(noo+
PD
d=1 nod) is the share of people born in o who migrate to d (nod) in the total popu-
lation born in o, soo is the share of those who stay in o (noo) among those born in o, and sdD = nod/
PD
d=1 nod
is the proportion of people born in o migrating to destination d over the total number of people born in o who
migrate (
PD
d=1 nod).19
Keeping in mind our normalization, assigning a utility of zero to staying in the home country, we note that
coeﬃcient f1 measures the eﬀect of an increase in the expected earnings gap between the origin-destination
pair on the left-hand side variable. We also point out that the standard logit model leads to a very similar
expression: simply substitute σ = 0 in equation (5). Intuitively, the term σ corrects for the fact that there is
some information in the total share of migrants that helps identify the average value of the diﬀerence in utilities
(due to costs or expected benefits) between migrants (to somewhere) and non-migrants. After this correction,
the diﬀerence in log odds equals the diﬀerence between the average utility net of cost associated to destination
d and the utility from staying in o, which we normalized to zero.
Substituting the definition of the shares and solving for lnnod the logarithm of migrants from o to d, equation
(5) can be rearranged into
lnnod =
1
1− σ
¡
f1W d − g1θd − g2βXod
¢
+
1
1− σ lnnoo −
σ
1− σ ln
DX
d=1
nod (7)
.
Noting that the last two terms on the right-hand side are constant across all destinations d, we can write
lnnod = Do + φwW d − γ1θd − γ2βXod, (8)
18In this case, the distribution of ζi collapses and νodi = εiod.
19If we did not normalize the utility from staying in the origin to zero we would have
ln sod − ln soo − σ ln sdD = f1(Wd −W o)− g1θd − g2βXod. (6)
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where Do is a constant that collects all terms that do not vary by destination d, φw =
f1
1−σ , γ1 =
g1
1−σ and
γ2 =
g2
1−σ . Equation (8) is the basis of our estimating equation, which obviously encompasses both the logit
and the nested logit models. In the former case, fixed eﬀect Do captures the size of the group of ”stayers”
(noo). In the case of the nested logit, the fixed eﬀect also includes the size of the group of migrants (
PD
d=1 nod),
which provides a correction for the average unobserved heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. At
any rate, term Do allows for identification of coeﬃcient φw, which measures the eﬀect of an increase in the gap
between the expected earnings in the home country and in destination d.
Assume that we observe, with some measurement error, the share of people born in country o and residing
in destination country d for a set of countries of origin O, destinations D, and for diﬀerent years t. The log of
the migration flow from o to destination d is given by
lnnodt = Dot +Dd + φwW dt + φ1Ydt + φ2βXod + eodt. (9)
Term eodt in (9) is the zero-mean measurement error. Coeﬃcient φw equals f1/(1 − σ). Term Dot is a
set of country-of-origin by time eﬀects and Dd are destination-country dummies. Note that we are allowing
for time-invariant, destination-specific migration costs (through dummies) as well as time-varying ones (Ydt),
which will proxy for changes in the tightness of immigration laws or in variables that may aﬀect these laws
(population, income inequality and the share of young people in the destination country).
As emphasized above, the set of dummies Dot absorbs any eﬀect specific to the country of origin by year.
Justified by our theoretical model, this term serves the purpose of controlling for, among other factors, specific
features common to all migrants, for the average migration opportunities/costs in each country of origin in each
year. Potential migrants in country o and year t compare average expected utility across destinations and choose
the one that maximizes their expected utility. However, besides the average wage there are many other features
of the country of origin aﬀecting the cost and opportunity of migrating over time (such as the sudden fall of
the Iron curtain in Europe, the loosening of emigration controls in China, and so on) and that specification
accounts for them.
Finally, let us note that the theoretically grounded empirical specification (9) can be interpreted as deter-
mining a relationship between stocks of migrants from each country o to each country d in each year t, or the
analogous flows. Given our interest in the economic eﬀects of immigration flows in the second part of the paper,
we shall focus on explaining immigration flows, and estimate the model using stocks as a robustness check.
Having data both on flows and stocks is a strength of our analysis. Data availability constrained previous
studies to the analysis of data on stocks only (e.g. Grogger and Hanson, 2008).
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4.2 Economic and Geographic determinants of bilateral migration stocks
The basic empirical specification that we estimate on the data and its variations are all consistent with (9). In
particular, Table 1 shows the coeﬃcients for several diﬀerent variations of the following basic specification:
ln(Migrant Stock)odt = φwW dt−1 +Dd +Dot + φd ln(Distance)od + φb(Land Border)od +
+φc(Colonial)od + φl(Language)od + eodt (10)
Specification (10) captures variables specific to the country-of-origin by year with the set of dummies Dot.
The fixed migration costs specific to country of destination d are absorbed by the dummies Dd and we explicitly
control for distance, colonial ties, common land border and common language as variables aﬀecting the pair-
specific bilateral migration costs Xod. The term W dt captures explicitly the eﬀect of the linear diﬀerence in
income between destination and origin country, measured as PPP gross domestic product per person in US
Dollars, 2000. The theory implies a positive and significant coeﬃcient φw. At the same time, if we assume
that costs of migration increase with distance, a negative value for φd is expected, while if sharing a border,
having colonial-era connections and speaking a common language decrease the costs of migration, φb, φc and φl
should be positive. The measures of (Migrant Stock)odt used in Table 1 are obtained from the bilateral stocks of
immigrants circa year 1990 (from Docquier 2007 data) updated backward and forward using the bilateral, yearly
migration flows data (described in section 3.1) and the estimated constant re-migration rate. In doing so we
allow for receiving-country-specific re-migration rates calibrated so that the stock of immigrants for each country
of destination match the stock measured around year 2000, also from the Docquier (2008) data. Specification
(1) in Table 1 reports the estimates of the coeﬃcients for the basic regression (10). In all regressions, unless
otherwise specified, we lag the explanatory variables one period, allowing them to aﬀect the stock of immigrants
in the following year. Our method of estimation is least squares, always including the destination countries
and the country-of-origin by year fixed eﬀects. We add one to each observation relative to stock and flows of
immigrants so that when taking logs we do not discard the 0 observations. Finally we weight observations by
the population of the destination country to correct for heteroskedasticity of the measurement errors and we
cluster the standard errors by bilateral country-pairs to account for the correlation of the errors.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the income diﬀerences (first row of Table 1) are always significant (most of the
time at the 5% confidence level) and positive. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient in the basic specification (1)
implies that the increase in the average income diﬀerences between destination and origin countries experienced
over the period 1980-2000 (equal to +7,000 US $ in PPP, calculated from Table 1A ) would generate an
increase of 42% (=0.06*7, since the income per capita is measured in thousands) in the stock of migrants to the
destination countries. This is equal to two thirds of the observed increase in the stock of immigrants from those
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74 countries in the 14 OECD countries, which grew by 60%. Hence, both statistically and economically the
absolute real income diﬀerences between sending and receiving countries, and their changes over the considered
period, can explain a very large fraction of the growth in the stock of immigrants.
As for the eﬀect of geographic variables on migration costs, the variable ”colonial relations” and the natural
logarithm of distance have very significant eﬀects with the expected signs. Having had colonial connections
more than doubles the average stock of immigrants from origin to destination, and that stock decreases by 80%
any time the bilateral distance increases by 50%. On the other hand, sharing a land border and speaking a
common language do not significant aﬀect bilateral migration flows. This is hardly surprising as most of the
large migratory flows to the OECD (except for Mexico-US) take place between countries that do not share a
land border or a common language. These two results are also found by Mayda (forthcoming) who does not
find any significant eﬀects for common border and common language dummies. Specification (2) checks whether
including the logarithm of the destination country wage ln(W dt) instead of its level results in similar eﬀects.20
The sign and significance of the income diﬀerence variable is as in specification (1), though the magnitude of
the coeﬃcient is smaller. In fact, a change by 1 (100%) in the log diﬀerence would only produce an increase
of 29% in the stock of immigrants. Notice, also, that in terms of log-diﬀerence (percentage diﬀerence) the gap
between origin and destination countries has barely changed between 1980 and 2000. This may imply that the
logarithmic specification is not the optimal approach; still, we are reassured that the sign and significance of
the income eﬀect does not depend on the specific functional form chosen.
Specification (3) decomposes the eﬀect of the expected (logarithmic) income diﬀerence (between destination
and origin) into the eﬀect of diﬀerences in (the logarithm of) GDP per worker and diﬀerences in (the logarithm
of) the employment rate (probability of employment)21. Both variables turn out to be significant, confirming
that the expected destination-country income, on which potential migrants base their decisions, depends on
potential wages and on the probability of being employed.
Specification (4) adds three destination-country variables that can plausibly aﬀect the willingness of the
country to accept immigrants and hence its immigration policies (and immigration costs). The first is total
population, the second is a measure of income distribution (Gini Coeﬃcient) and the third is the share of
young (aged 15 to 24) individuals in the population. A country whose population is growing may find it
easier to absorb new immigrants with little consequence for its citizens. Similarly, in periods when the income
distribution is more equal, the opposition to immigration may be milder. There is weak evidence of a positive
eﬀect of population on immigration flows and of a negative eﬀect of inequality: the point estimates have the
expected sign but the coeﬃcients are not significant at standard levels of confidence. Also, the share of young
20Recall that Wot or its log are absorbed into the country of origin by year fixed eﬀects.
21We decompose the eﬀects of GDP per worker and employment rates in the logarithmic specification because the logarithm of
GDP per person is the sum of those two logarithmic components.
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workers does not seem to be significant at all, possibly because young workers may fear the competition from
immigrants (who are typically younger than the average native) or, alternatively, they may be more flexible and
mobile in adjusting their occupation in response to immigrants, and hence suﬀer less from the competition.
In specification (5) we consider whether including longer lags of the income variable changes its impact on
immigration. As it may take more than one year before income diﬀerences put in motion a migration response,
including a longer lag may strengthen the eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on log income, lagged two years, is only
marginally diﬀerent from that of the one year lag. If one includes both lags (not reported) or two lags and
the contemporaneous value (also not reported) only the two-year lagged income diﬀerence is significant (with
a coeﬃcient of 0.06). This implies that it takes at least one year and possibly up to two years for income
diﬀerentials to stimulate migrations.
Finally, we show in specifications (6) and (7) the results omitting the UK, whose immigration flows before
1990 look suspiciously small (see Panel 1A), and the US, whose immigration is dominated by Mexicans and
has been analyzed in many studies. Neither omission aﬀects the results much. We also run other checks
changing the weighting of the observations and the clustering of the residuals or using only the observations
after 1990. All estimates of the income and geography variables are quite stable and similar to those in the basic
specification. A particularly interesting robustness check (that will be systematically incorporated in Table 2)
is the introduction of a full set of origin-destination pair dummies. Such a specification adds 1022 fixed eﬀects
and removes the geographic controls (absorbed in the dummies). The estimated eﬀect of wage diﬀerentials on
migration flows is equal to 0.054 with a standard error of 0.02 . Hence, still significant and very similar to the
estimate obtained in the basic specification of Table 1.
4.3 Eﬀect of immigration laws on bilateral migration flows
In evaluating the eﬀects of immigration reforms, it is easier to look at the eﬀect on subsequent immigration
flows. After all, the immigrant stocks are the long-run accumulation of yearly flows, so the determinants of the
first should also determine the second. Hence we simply adopt the specification in (9) and use as the dependent
variable the logarithm of the flow of immigrants from country o to country d in year t, adding immigration laws
as an explanatory variable. Column (1) of Table 2, Panel A reports the relevant estimates for the following
specification:
ln(Migrant F low)odt = φwW dt−1 + φR(Tightness)dt−1 +Dot + φd ln(Distance)od
+φb(Land Border)od + φc(Colonial)od + φl(Language)od + eodt (11)
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Our data on (Migrant F low)odt are from the OECD International Migration Database, from 74 countries
of origin into 14 OECD countries. The variable ”Immigration policy tightness” is the measure of tightness
of immigration (and asylum) laws described in section 3.222. The other columns of Table 2 Panel A perform
variations and robustness checks on this basic specification. In Panel B of Table 2 we estimate a similar
specification but now include a full set of (73x14) country-pair fixed eﬀects, Dod, rather than the four bilateral
variables (Distance, Land Border, Colonial, Language) in order to capture any specific time-invariant bilateral
costs of migration.
Moving from left to right in Table 2 we modify our basic specification (1) by including income in loga-
rithm, rather than in levels, (specification 2), then using a broader measure of tightness of immigration laws
(specification 3), or longer lags of the explanatory variables (specification 4). Specification (5) includes extra
destination country controls, (6) omits the UK data, whose immigration flows recorded before 1990 appear
suspiciously small and (7) omits the US, which is the largest country and has been studied in detail. In all
these specifications we include four variables that capture aspects of the immigration laws. The first variable is
our constructed measure of ”Tightness of entry laws”, the second is our measure of ”Tightness of asylum laws”.
Both are described in section 3.2 and their values for each country and year are shown in Panel 2A. We also
include dummies for the two most important multilateral treaties aﬀecting several of the considered countries23.
The ”Maastricht” treaty was ratified by most EU countries in 1992. Among other things, it introduced
free labor mobility for workers of the member states and it led to the introduction of the Euro, which may
have reduced migration costs within the European Union. The corresponding dummy takes a value of one for
those country-pairs participating into the agreement only in the years in which the agreement is in place and
0 otherwise24. The ”Schengen” agreement, adopted in diﬀerent years by 22 European countries, regulates and
coordinates immigration and border policies among the signatory countries. While it eases intra-EU movement
for citizens of the signatory countries, the agreement also implies more restrictive border controls to enter
the ”Schengen” area. The corresponding dummy takes a value of one for country-pairs participating into the
agreement only in the years in which the agreement is in place and 0 otherwise. Three main results emerge from
Table 2. First, income diﬀerences between origin and destination country (whether in logs or in levels) have a
positive and significant eﬀect on immigration flows to OECD countries in almost every specification. Second,
the ”Tightness of entry” has a significant negative eﬀect on immigration flows in most specifications. Each
reform that introduced less restrictive measures increased, on average, immigration by around 10% (the median
estimate among all specifications). For instance, this implies that a country like Canada, whose immigration
policy loosened by 6 points between 1985 and 2005 (see Panel 2A), should exhibit an increase in immigration
22Notice that all the explanatory variables (that vary over time) are included with one lag.
23We have run a few other specifications such as a Tobit regression with censoring at 0, to account for the clustering of observations
at 0, and obtained a coeﬃcient of 0.25 on Wdt−1 and of -0.14 on Tightness confirming the results in Table 2.
24The dummy is one after 1992 (year of the retification of the treaty) for pairs of countries within the EU-15.
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rates of around 60%. The yearly immigration rates, in Canada, went from 0.5% of population in the early
eighties to 0.7-0.8% in the early 2000’s. That is, the entire increase in immigration flows can be attributed to
the change in the laws. Third, among the other laws the most significant eﬀect is associated with the Maastricht
treaty whose eﬀect is estimated to be significant in all specifications of Panel B (although not for Panel A), and
implies a boost to immigration between the countries that signed the agreement of 60%. Tightness of asylum
laws had a negative (but only occasionally significant) impact on immigration and the Schengen agreement
had a positive eﬀect but mostly non-significant. Interestingly, column (3) in both Panel A and B reveals that
combining immigration entry- and stay- laws decreases the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient, suggesting
that mainly entry laws had an eﬀect on the actual inflow of immigrants. The eﬀects of tighter entry laws
is very robust and significant to the inclusion of other receiving-country controls such as population, income
distribution and the share of young among the receiving country variables (specification 5, both in Panel A
and B). Interesting Asylum laws eﬀects are more significant when we estimate the Panel with a full set of
bilateral country eﬀect. Omitting the UK (column 6) or the US (Column 7) does not change the results much.
The estimated eﬀects on the geographic variables (not reported in Table 2 and available only for Panel A) are
qualitatively and quantitatively close to the estimates reported in Table 1. In particular, sharing a land border
(point estimate -1.6 and standard error 1.01) and sharing a common language (point estimate 0.52, standard
error 0.53) have no significant impact on migration flows, while having had colonial ties (point estimate 3.91 and
standard error 0.65) and the log of distance (point estimate -2.23 standard error 0.23) are both very significant
in their impact on migration flows25.
Let us emphasize that the estimates in Table 2 Panel B include 1022 country-pair fixed eﬀects and 1825
country-of-origin by year fixed eﬀects. Hence any variation is identified by the change over time in a specific
bilateral migratory flow, after controlling for any country-of-origin by year specific factor. We are not aware
of any previous analysis that could run such a demanding specification on bilateral migration panel data. All
in all, our analysis finds statistically and quantitatively significant eﬀects of income diﬀerentials on bilateral
immigration stocks and flows. These eﬀects are very robust to sample choice, specification and inclusion of
controls. We also find strong evidence that the receiving country laws, particularly those relative to the entry
of immigrants, significantly aﬀected the size of yearly inflows. The inclusion of income diﬀerences in levels or
in logs does not produce very diﬀerent eﬀects.
Finally we want to check the robustness of our results to diﬀerent measures of wage and to the inclusion of
other receiving country policies. Table 3 shows such checks. While relative to the population in the counties
of origin immigrants exhibit a positive skill selection (Grogger and Hanson, 2008) their composition relative to
the destination country often exhibits lower average education and skill level. Hence the average immigrant
25The reported point estimates and standard errors are from the basic specification of column 1, Panel A, Table 2.
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may be concerned with the median wage of the destination country (rather than its average) and she may be
attracted by more generous welfare provision in the destination country. Using information on average income
and on the Gini coeﬃcients of each receiving country, and assuming a log-normal income distribution, we can
compute the median wage in each receiving country and use it as explanatory variable26. Table 3 specification
(1) reports the estimates of the eﬀect of median income on immigration when also controlling for immigration
entry laws and for the set of destination country dummies, origin by year dummies and bilateral geographic
variables. The coeﬃcient estimated is a bit smaller than when using average income but still very significant
and the immigration laws maintain their eﬀect unchanged. Table 3 specification (2) includes a measure of
welfare spending per capita in the receiving country (in thousands of 2000 PPP $) between 1980 and 2000. The
data source is OECD (2001) and the welfare spending includes the cash transfers plus the value of services on
pension, disability and family support. The regression finds a positive role of welfare spending in attracting
immigrants and confirms the importance of income per capita and immigration laws. Finally, specification (3)
includes two measures of labor market protection in the destination country. The ratio of minimum to median
wage and an index measuring the degree of employment protection (that combines measures of stringency of
firing laws, dismissal laws, hiring laws and unemployment benefits). That index ranges between 0 (minimal
protection) and 4 (maximum protection) with a standard deviation across countries around 1. Both variables
have several missing values and they only cover the period 1980-200027. The variables are from Mayda (2007)
who in turn follows the definitions of Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpertta (1998) . Interestingly the results show
that stronger labor market protections (high minimum wage and high value of the index) are associated with
lower immigration flows. Income and immigration laws still have the usual very significant eﬀect. Countries
that increased the protection of insiders in labor markets are likely to provide worse employment opportunities
to immigrants than countries with less protective and more competitive markets. Hence even controlling for
immigration laws, labor market protection seem to discourage immigration.
5 Impact of Immigration on OECD countries
5.1 A Production Function Framework
In order to evaluate the impact of immigration on the receiving economy’s income, average wages, and return
to capital, we use an aggregate production function framework, akin to the one used in growth accounting (see
for instance Chapter 10 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). Suppose that total GDP in each destination country
26If personal income y in a country is distributed according to the lognormal distribution (i.e. ln(y) is distributed as N(μ, σ))
then the relationship between the gini coeﬃcient G and the standard deviation of the log-normal distribution is: σ =
√
2Φ−1(G+1
2
)
where Φ is the CDF of a normal N(0, 1).Then, calling y the average income, the Median income is given by the following formula:
yM = ye−σ
2/2.
27Notice from table 3 that the sample of specification (3) only includes 8673 observations.
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and year, Ydt, is produced using a labor input represented by total hours worked, Ldt (that can be decomposed
into Employmentdt times Hours per workerdt ), services of physical capital represented by Kdt and total factor
productivity Adt. According to the popular Cobb-Douglas production function:
Ydt = AdtKαdtL1−αdt (12)
where α is the capital income share and can be approximated for the destination countries in our sample by
0.3328. In such a framework if we intend to analyze how immigration flows aﬀects income or wages (marginal
productivity of labor), we need to identify first how immigrations aﬀects the supply of each input and of total
factor productivity. Then we can combine the eﬀects of immigration using the implications of the model.
Specifically, the percentage changes in total real GDP, Ydt, real GDP per hour, ydt, and the average real wage,
wdt, are given, respectively, by:
∆Ydt
Ydt
=
∆Adt
Adt
+ α∆Kdt
Kdt
+ (1− α)∆Ldt
Ldt
(13)
∆ydt
ydt
=
∆wdt
wdt
=
∆Adt
Adt
+ α(∆Kdt
Kdt
− ∆Ldt
Ldt
) (14)
If we can identify the percentage changes in Adt, Kdt, and Ldt in response to exogenous immigration flows
to the country we will be able to evaluate the impact of immigration on total income, labor productivity and
average wages.
Clearly, immigration flows directly aﬀect labor input Ldt by adding potential workers. However, the increase
in employment may be less than one-for-one if immigrants displace native workers (out of the country or out of
the labor market). In addition, there may also be composition eﬀects if immigrants’ employment rates or hours
worked are lower than those of natives.
Regarding the capital input, standard models with endogenous capital accumulation imply that immigration-
induced increases in the labor force will generate investment opportunities and greater capital accumulation,
up to the point that the marginal product of capital returns to its pre-shock value. However, the short-run
response of the capital stock to an international immigration flow can be less than complete and it has yet to
be quantified empirically.
Concerning TFP, on the one hand immigrants may promote specialization/complementarities (Ottaviano and
Peri 2008) which increase the set of productive skills (Peri and Sparber, forthcoming) and increase competition
in the labor markets, generating eﬃciency gains that increase TFP. Or there can be positive scale eﬀects on
productivity if immigrants bring new ideas or reinforce agglomeration economies (of the kind measured by
28See Jones (2008) page 24 and Gollin (2002) to justify this assumption.
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Ciccone and Hall, 1996). On the other hand, it is also possible that immigration induces adoption of less
“productive”, unskilled-intensive technologies (as in Lewis 2005) that lead to reductions in measured TFP.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether an immigration shock increases, decreases or does not aﬀect
TFP.
We denote by ∆FdtPopdt the immigration rate, namely the change in the foreign-born population Fdt (immigration
flows to country d in year t) relative to the total population of country d at the beginning of year t (Popdt). We
then estimate the following set of regressions:
∆Xdt
Xdt
= Dt + γx
∆Fdt
Popdt
+ est (15)
Where X will be alternatively total hours worked (Ldt),29, services of physical capital (Kdt) and total factor
productivity (Adt). As a check we also analyze directly the eﬀect of ∆FdtPopdt on aggregate GDP, GDP per hour,
and capital per worker. The term Dt captures year fixed eﬀects that absorb common movements in productivity
and inputs across countries in each year. In order to assert that the estimated coeﬃcients cγx identify the causal
eﬀect of immigration on domestic variables we will instrument total immigration flows to a country with the sum
of bilateral flows to that country predicted using our empirical model in (11), but excluding variables relative to
the destination country30. Essentially we predict those flows using only the components that vary by country
of origin and time, and the fixed bilateral migration costs.
5.2 Measurement of Employment, Capital Intensity and Productivity
The data on income and factors of production are mostly from OECD datasets. Specifically, GDP data is from
the OECD Productivity dataset, and employment and hours worked are from the OECD-STAN dataset. The
data cover the whole period 1980-2005 for the 14 countries in our sample.31
The capital services data are also from the OECD Productivity dataset, but we make use of the data on
aggregate investment in the Penn World Tables (version 6.2) to extend its coverage. Let us provide a bit more
detail on the capital data that we use. The conceptually preferred measure of capital for our purposes is the
services of the capital stock that contribute to current production. Capital services are computed as follows.
For each type of capital (six or seven, depending on the country), we accumulate past investments making two
adjustments. First, we take into account that older units of capital provide fewer services than newer ones
(eﬃciency weighting). Secondly, we take into account the productive life of each type of capital (retirement
pattern). Finally, we aggregate across all types of capital using the relative productivity of each type to obtain
the stock of productive capital. The capital services data reported by the OECD is the rate of change of the
29Also decomposed between employment Employmentdt and Hours per workerdt.
30Essentially we omit the term

Wdt−1 −W ot−1

and the term from the basic specification.
31The data on Hours for Luxembourg start in 1983. We use employment growth to fill in the missing values.
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stock of productive capital and it is interpreted as the flow of capital services that went into production during
that period.
The original data on capital services is available annually from 1985 onward and only covers 12 out of the 14
countries in our main sample.32 In order to expand the data to cover the whole country-year panel we use data
on gross fixed capital formation. Specifically, we proceed in three steps. First, we use the long series on real
investment provided by the PWT to compute the stock of capital for the 14 countries in our sample between
1980 and 2005. More specifically, we initialize the capital stock in 1970 following the procedure based on the
perpetual inventory method used in Young (1995). Next, we iteratively build the entire series of capital values
for the period 1980-2005. The main diﬀerence between this capital stock and the stock of productive capital
derived from capital services data is that here we are imposing the same growth rate across all types of capital.
Second, we build a predictor for productive capital using the data on capital stocks that we just created. In
particular, we estimate a regression model where the dependent variable is the change in the log of productive
capital and the main explanatory variable is the change in the log of the capital stock. We estimate this
relationship for the sample period for which we have data on both variables, namely, 1985-2005. The slope
coeﬃcient is 1.31, estimated very precisely. A coeﬃcient larger than one makes sense. In good times, firms may
increase the rate of replacement of old capital goods for new ones. This automatically leads to the provision of
greater capital services, even keeping constant the total capital stock. This is because of the age-flow profile of
capital goods used in the calculation of capital services: a new truck is assumed to produce more services than
an old one. Finally, we use our predictor to extend the data on capital services to cover the whole sample. For
the twelve countries for which we have data on capital services (that is, the growth rate of productive capital),
we use our predictor to extend the data back to 1980. For the two countries for which we lack data on capital
services we use the prediction rule for the entire period, 1980-2005.
Equipped with a full panel for real GDP and labor and capital inputs, we compute total factor productivity
as a Solow residual, imposing a labor share of 0.66 and using total hours worked and capital services as the
inputs into production.33
Let us now have a descriptive look at our panel data for income, labor, capital services, and TFP. Table A3
reports annualized growth rates of these variables for three sub-periods: the 1980s, the 1990s, and 2000-2005.
Three features stand out. First, there is a noticeable slowdown in economic growth between 1980 and 2005 for
our sample of OECD countries. In the three sub-periods real GDP grew annually by 2.72%, 2.62%, and 1.98%,
respectively. The slowdown is also noticeable in terms of lower employment growth (from 0.68% to 0.34%),
lower capital growth (from 3.43% to 3.11%), and lower TFP growth (from 1.14% to 0.73%). Note also the large
32Norway and Luxembourg are missing.
33The OECD Productivity dataset features an analogous measure of TFP for some countries covering part of our period of
interest. Our own measure is very strongly correlated with theirs. We run a regression of growth rates of the two measures amd
find that the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.92 and the standard error is 0.018.
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cross-sectional dispersion.
Secondly, average employment growth was substantially higher than average growth in total hours worked
between 1980 and 2005. That is, hours per worker on average fell during the period. Finally, capital intensity
on average increased substantially over the period. The average annual growth in capital services (in real terms)
was roughly three times as large as the annual growth rate in employment.
5.3 The Eﬀects of Immigration: OLS
Table 4 presents the estimates, using least squares methods, of the coeﬃcients γx from equation 15. The
dependent variables are, in row order, inputs to production (total labor input L, Employment, Hours per
worker and Capital K ), total factor productivity (A), total GDP (Y ), capital per worker, and output per hour
worked. Notice that not all the estimated coeﬃcients are independent of each other due to the relationship
between inputs and output provided by the production function. Hence, for instance, in the basic specifications
in which no other control variables are included and the selected observations are common between regressions,
by virtue of (14) the estimated coeﬃcient on (∆Output per Hour/Output per Hour) in the last row of the
table should be equal to the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient on ∆Y/Y and the coeﬃcient on ∆L/L34 and
the coeﬃcient on (∆Capital per worker/Capital per Worker) in the second to last row should be equal to the
diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient on ∆K/K and the one on (∆Employment/Employment). Since we regress
the percentage change of the dependent variable on the inflow of immigrants as a percentage of the initial
population, the interpretation of the coeﬃcients (as elasticities) is straightforward.
The diﬀerent columns in Table 4 correspond to diﬀerent samples and specifications. Specification (1) is
the basic one and it estimates 15 on 25 yearly changes (1980-2005) for 14 OECD countries. The method of
estimation is OLS with year fixed eﬀects (since the variables are already in changes we do not include country-
level eﬀects35). The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by country.
Specification (2) omits the US, which is one of the most studied cases, to show that the rest of the sample does
not behave too diﬀerently from the US. Column 3 includes only the continental European countries, excluding
the Anglo-Saxon group (US, UK, Canada and Australia) often considered as more ”immigration friendly”.
Specification (4) includes only the more recent years (1990-2005) , for which the most accurate migration data
from the OECD are available and specification (5) includes in each regression the lagged level of the dependent
variable to control for convergence to a balanced growth path. Finally, specification (6) uses as explanatory
variable the immigration flows net of imputed re-migration of the stock of immigrants.
While there is significant potential for endogeneity in these OLS specifications, let us comment on some
34The reader can easily check that these relations hold.
35We have also run the panel regression with country fixed eﬀects, obtaining similar qualitative estimates, with larger point
estimates and standard errors, however.
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robust and clear correlations that emerge from Table 4. First, the coeﬃcient on the total labor input ∆L/L is
very close to one in five out of the six specifications. Except for specification (6) we can never reject that the
eﬀect on total labor input is equal to one. This suggests that the economy is able to employ all new arrivals
without crowding out native workers: the arrival of one new immigrant is associated to an increase in total
employment equal to one. Our estimates also suggest that the increase in total labor (hours worked) is fully
along the extensive margin, with no changes in average hours worked per person.
Secondly, the OLS estimate of the eﬀect on the rate of growth of the capital stock is close to one in most
specifications. This implies that investment (or capital inflows) adjust to the larger potential worker pool in
just one year, eﬀectively leaving unchanged the capital-labor ratio. Row seven shows that capital-worker ratios
are not significantly aﬀected by immigration across all six specifications. Finally, the estimates in row 5 imply
that there is no significant eﬀect of immigration on TFP, ∆A/A.
These eﬀects, combined together, imply that the inflows of immigrants are associated with larger employ-
ment, larger total GDP, and unchanged wages, capital intensity and GDP per hour. These correlations also
hold when we consider European countries only (specification 3), when we restrict ourselves to the more recent
period 1990-2005 (in specification 4) or when we include lagged levels of the dependent variable (specification
5). The results obtained using the net immigration flows, on the other hand (specification 6), show much larger
coeﬃcients and standard errors on labor inputs and capital inputs (with similar eﬀects on productivity). This
suggests that the imputed re-migration flows are probably a rather noisy measure of actual outflows of immi-
grants and by subtracting these imprecisely estimated outflows we are reducing the value of flows and increasing
the noise to signal ratio. Still, even this specification does not show any evidence of a change in the capital-labor
ratio or GDP per person associated with immigration. What seems implausible in specification 6, however, is
the very large (more than 1 to 1) response of labor inputs to immigrants, which may indicate measurement
error or endogeneity problems. For this reason we prefer the gross flows, which are directly measured in the
data, and which we use in the instrumental variable analysis below.
5.4 Immigration Eﬀects: Instruments and 2SLS approach
The most significant limitation of the estimates presented in Table 4 is that immigration flows are endogenous.
In fact, we have shown in section 4 that immigration flows respond vigorously to changes in wage diﬀerences
between origin and destination. Employment, capital and TFP are the determinants of those wages, hence we
cannot consider immigration as exogenous to them. The framework of section 4, however, provides an analysis
of the determinants of the international migration flows and lends us a solution to the problem of endogeneity.
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In particular, consider the bilateral regression model used in Table 2, Panel B:
ln(Migrant F low)odt = φwW dt−1 + φR(Tightness)dt−1 +Dot +Dod + eodt (16)
The terms Dot capture any economic, demographic and cost determinant of migration out of country o which
varies over time t. That set of dummies captures all the so called ”push-factors” of immigration that do not
depend on specific destination countries but only on conditions in the countries of origin. The terms Dod, on
the other hand, capture the fixed bilateral costs of migrating from o to d. They mostly reflect geographic factors
and the existence of historical networks which provide information and ease the adjustment of immigrants to the
destination country. Therefore, only the terms φwW dt−1 and φR(Tightness)dt−1 are specific to the country of
destination and in particular to its economic conditions. The wage diﬀerential is the primary included economic
determinant of immigration, while the tightness of immigration laws can be considered as a determinant of the
cost of immigration which is still related to current economic conditions, although to a lesser degree.
Accordingly, we use the estimates of Dot and Dod in (16), to predict the log of annual bilateral flows
from all countries of origin to their destinations. Those terms are, by construction, independent of time-varying
economic (and legal) factors in the country of destination. Using these predicted values we calculate the imputed
immigration rate for each of the 14 destination countries in each year (adding the predicted immigration rates
from each country of origin).36 These imputed immigration rates are what we use as instruments for the actual
immigration rates.
Table 5 shows the statistics for the first stage regressions using the predicted immigration flows from bDot
and bDod estimated in 16. We test the significance of the instrument on the whole sample (specification 1)
or omitting the US (specification 2), using only European countries of destination (specification 3) or only on
the more recent period (specification 4). In each case the coeﬃcient on the instrument is positive and very
significant, and the partial R-square of the instrument is between 0.41 and 0.43. Each regression includes time
fixed eﬀects. The F-statistic of significance of the instrument is usually above 300. Thus, the instrument is quite
powerful and captures only the variation in immigration rates due to the interactions between country-of-origin
specific factors and bilateral migration costs (due to geography and historical bilateral networks). For instance,
the large increase in Polish emigrants in the period 1990-1995 due to the end of the communist regime produced
a large Poland-specific term ( bDot) for those years in the migration equation. The fact that Poland has smaller
bilateral costs of migration to Germany and the UK than to (say) Japan (which is captured by the higher
estimated bDod for Germany and the UK) implies that the predicted migration rates from Poland to Germany
and the UK, using our model, are larger then the predicted migration rates to Japan, and particularly so during
36One further source of error in proxying the actual immigration rates with those predicted from the regression is that in the
bilateral regression we only have 74 countries of origin (the most important ones) and add the predicted flows from those. The
immigration rates, instead, measure the total immigration flows from those countries plus any other country in the world.
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the years of large Polish migration. Recall that while they are additive in equation 16, the terms Dot and Dod
predict the logarithms of immigrant flows. Hence, when we calculate their levels (divided by population to
obtain immigration rates) the two eﬀects are multiplicative, so for a given sending country shock, Dot, the eﬀect
would be magnified by a large Dod. The constructed immigration rate represents the exogenous (push-driven)
variation in the immigration rates of the receiving country and will be used as an instrument.
Table 6 shows the 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of immigration on inputs, productivity and per capita
income. The specifications and the dependent variables are as in Table 4. Again, the estimates obtained using
net immigration flows (specification 5) seem too large, but all the other specifications (using gross flows) are
consistent with the results obtained using OLS in Table 4. In particular, the eﬀect of immigration on total
labor supply ∆L/L is always very close to one (between 0.96 and 1.02) and precisely estimated (standard error
around 0.09). Similarly, the coeﬃcient on the capital adjustment (∆K/K) is always larger than one (and in
most cases not significantly diﬀerent from it) suggesting full adjustment of the capital stock within one year,
so that the change in the capital labor ratio (∆Capital per worker/Capital per Worker) is never significantly
diﬀerent from zero. Similarly, there seems to be no significant eﬀect of immigrants on productivity changes
(∆A/A). Our estimates are robust to the choice of countries in the sample (specification 2 omits the US, and
specification 3 omits Europe) and to the choice of the period (specification 4 considers only 1990-2005).
All in all, the results of Table 6 confirm the correlations obtained with the OLS estimates of Table 4.
Immigrant flows caused (and predicted) by country-of-origin and geographic factors increase the employment
and labor supply in the receiving country one-for-one. Such an increase in the pool of workers induces increases
in the stock of capital (through capital inflows or domestic investment) that, even within one year, allow the
capital-labor ratio (and therefore the wage and return to capital) to the recover its pre-immigration level.
Overall, immigration simply leads to an increase in the overall size of the economy: GDP grows in percentage
roughly by the same amount as the immigration rate.
Consider, for instance, the average yearly inflow of immigrants in the US between 1995 and 2005, which
was around 0.3-0.4% of the population. According to our estimates, these inflows caused US GDP to grow by
0.3-0.4% each year, without any eﬀect on the average wage or on labor productivity neither in the short nor in
the long run.
The reader may find puzzling that the capital stock adjusts fast enough to eliminate any eﬀect of immigration
on wages even within one year. Let us emphasize that immigration flows, even those that are push-driven, have
been quite predictable and, as a percentage of the population, these flows are always small (rarely above 0.5%
of the population). Therefore, with yearly investments on the order of 20-30% of GDP there is ample room to
adjust investment by a relatively modest amount in order to accommodate new immigrant workers. Moreover
immigration may also trigger international capital movements that help in the adjustment.
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As a further check that our short-run estimates are not driven by some bias arising from serial correlation
in the data, we have re-estimated the responses of employment, capital, TFP and income to immigration over
5-year changes (rather than yearly changes). Table 7 reports the estimated coeﬃcients from four diﬀerent
specifications. Notice, importantly, that the coeﬃcients on labor adjustment ( ∆L/L) and capital adjustment
(∆K/K) are still close to one and not significantly diﬀerent from one another (the capital response still seems
to be a bit larger than one). The eﬀects on productivity (∆A/A), on the capital-labor ratio and output per
hour worked, are all insignificant. The adjustment within one year seems fairly similar to the adjustment over
5 years and compatible with the adjustment in the neoclassical model with endogenous capital: more workers
lead to larger investment and output, and do not aﬀect labor productivity so that capital per worker and wages
remain unaﬀected.
5.5 Eﬀects of Immigration in Bad Economic Times
The results of Table 6 show that on average push-driven immigration triggers a one-for-one increase in total
labor (hours worked) and in the capital stock, leaving the capital-labor ratio unchanged even in the short run.
But do the eﬀects of immigration vary depending on the business cycle in the receiving country? In particular,
what is the response of capital and labor to an immigration shock during ”bad economic times”? When demand
is weak, does employment expand so as to employ all of the newly arrived workers?
This section attempts to estimate the eﬀects of immigration shocks, allowing for diﬀerences between ”bad
economic times” and normal periods. Specifically, we shall say that a country in a given year is in ”bad economic
times” if its output gap is below −1%.37 According to our definition, the OECD economies have been in ”bad
economic times” during 36% of the time, between 1980 and 2005. 38. When an economy is not in bad times we
shall say it is in ”normal times”.
We proceed to estimate regression models analogous to (15) but allowing coeﬃcient γx to take on diﬀerent
values in bad and in normal times. Table 8 reports our findings. The two columns under specification 1
correspond to the IV estimates of the eﬀects of immigration in normal times and in bad times. These figures are
analogous to the basic specification in Table 6. Specification 2 controls for lagged GDP per worker as regressor,
capturing economic conditions in the previous period as well as controlling for economic convergence.
Two results emerge consistently from both specifications. First, the response of the stock of capital is larger
in normal times (1.7) than in bad economic times (1.2). However, the diﬀerence is relatively small (0.5). In
comparison, TFP is unaﬀected by immigration, both in bad and in normal times. Interestingly, the response of
total labor used in production (hours worked) is much lower in bad times (0.5) than normally (1.7). Similarly,
37The output gap, as defined by the OECD in the Economic Outlook, is the diﬀerence between actual Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and potential GDP as a percent of potential GDP. Data on the output gap for the 14 countries over the period 1980-2005
are available from the OECD-STAN database. When actual output is below potential output, the output gap is negative.
38That is, 133 observations out of 336
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the response of employment in bad times (0.9) is much lower than in normal times (1.7). Thus in bad times,
possibly due to weak demand, the economy is unable to expand employment by the full size of immigration.
Roughly speaking, the arrival of 10 additional immigrants leads to an increase in employment equal to 9.
Consequently, ten percent of the inflow remains unemployed or, alternatively, some native workers are crowded
out. In contrast, in normal times (output gap above −1%), immigration appears to create employment in net
terms. Following the arrival of 10 immigrants, employment expands by 17. That is, there are seven that can now
be occupied by natives. This reflects the coeﬃcient larger than one in the response of capital to immigration in
normal times. Row 7 in Table 8 reports the estimated eﬀect on capital per worker. It is worth noting that the
estimated coeﬃcient is larger (and positive) in bad economic times. This is due to the larger contraction in the
response of labor, relative to capital, in bad times.39
We conclude by noting that when the destination country is going through bad economic times, immigration
flows decline endogenously (due to the wage decline and the estimated response of immigration to wages). Hence
there is an automatic mechanism that reduces immigration flows when they are less beneficial and, conversely,
increases them when the economy recovers.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The causes and eﬀects of immigration on Western economies have frequently been analyzed by considering a
single receiving country. While very useful, these studies have raised several issues that require multi-country
data and cry out for investigating the eﬀects of immigration beyond the labor market. For instance, it is widely
recognized that the speed of adjustment of capital is a key determinant of the short-run eﬀects of immigration
on wages (see Borjas and Katz 2007, Ottaviano and Peri 2008) and labor productivity. Lacking very long series
of capital stock data, it is hard to estimate its response to immigration using data for a single country.40
Furthermore, the literature recognizes the need for ”purely push-driven” migration flows in order to identify
the causal eﬀect of immigrants on economic outcomes in the destination country (Card 2001). Again, push
factors are hard to identify in the context of one receiving country only.
This paper suggests a new approach that addresses these issues. We provide a framework to estimate the
determinants of migration flows that can be used to isolate the push-driven factors. And we use the latter as an
exogenous source of variation to identify the causal eﬀects of immigration at the country-level. We apply this
approach to an extensive, new dataset containing migration flows, immigration laws for the main destination
countries, and macroeconomic variables spanning the period 1980-2005.
39We also employed an alternative definition of ”bad economic times” based on year-over-year output growth. The eﬀects we
obtained were similar to those presented in Table 8. We also attempted to estimate the eﬀects of immigration in ”very bad economic
times” (gap < −2.35%). However, these events became very rare and led to very imprecise estimates (57 observations).
40For attempts to estimate the response of capital exploiting within-country regional variation see Peri (2008) and Ortega (2008b),
respectively, for the US and Spain.
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In addition to supplying the new data, our paper makes three additional contributions. First, following
Grogger and Hanson (2008), we derive a pseudo-gravity equation for bilateral migration flows from a model
where (i) individuals make utility-maximizing migration choices and (ii) we allow for individual unobserved
heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. The model implies that the logarithm of the flow (or stock)
of migrants from country o (origin) to country d (destination) is a function of the wage diﬀerential between
d and o, of bilateral migration costs and of country-of-origin specific eﬀects. Therefore, conveniently, we are
microfounding a pseudo-gravity equation for international migrations. We estimate that an increase in the wage
diﬀerential between origin and destination of 1000 US $ (in 2000 PPP prices) increases the flow of migrants
by 6% to 10% of their initial value. We also show that the immigration reforms that made entry laws more
restrictive were eﬀective in reducing migration flows by 10%, on average, for each reform. We use our model
to separate between push factors, bilateral costs and pull factors, and construct a prediction of migration flows
that is exogenous to the economic conditions in the country of destination (pull factors).
Secondly, we use the predicted push-driven flows as an instrument to estimate the causal eﬀect of immigration
on employment, capital accumulation, and total factor productivity. We find that, already within one year,
employment responds to immigration one for one, and capital adjusts so as to maintain the initial capital
intensity. TFP is not aﬀected. As a result, immigration simply increases the size of the economy, with no
negative impact on average wages or labor productivity in the short run (one year) or in the long run (five
years).
Finally, we provide estimates of the diﬀerential eﬀects of immigration depending on the state of the economy
in the receiving country. We find that during bad economic times in the receiving country, the eﬀects of
immigration are less beneficial. Following an immigration flow equal to one percent of the population, GDP
increases only by 0.6%. Even though the stock of capital still responds vigorously to an immigration shock,
the economy is unable to employ all of the newly arrived workers. Or, alternatively, it may do so at the cost
of some crowding out of native workers. In contrast, in normal times immigration triggers a net increase in
total employment. This arises from the rapid and vigorous response of the capital stock, which operates either
through an increase in domestic investment or through capital inflows.
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A Data on Migration Flows and Stocks
The International Migration Data (2007) published by the OECD originate from contributions of the national
correspondents (National Statistical Agencies) organized in a network called ”The Continuous Reporting Sys-
tem on Migration” (SOPEMI). Since the criteria for classifying immigrants and for registering the population
may vary significantly across countries the data are not necessarily homogeneous. Also, for each receiving
country the IMD (2007) records only the immigrants from the 15 countries of origin with the largest number
of immigrants. The OECD statistical annex to the data emphasizes the diﬃculty of measuring the undocu-
mented/illegal immigrants with this method. Only through censuses or after a regularization program are some
of the undocumented immigrants measured.
The total inflows and outflows of the foreign population are derived from population registers and residence
and work permits. Due to the fact that removal from the registers due to departure is much less common than
the inclusion due to arrival these data are much better at measuring inflows than outflows of immigrants. The
countries of origin that we are able to record consistently and that therefore constitute our universe in the
bilateral regression analyses are listed in Table A2 of the Appendix.
In the construction of the net immigration flows and immigration stocks for each year and each origin-
destination pair we compute the estimated rate of re-migration of the foreign population in each country. These
re-migration rates, which measure the percentage of the existing stock of immigrants in a country that leave
the country, are calculated to match the stocks of immigrants (in 1990 and 2000) with the flows between those
years in each country. The imputed yearly re-migration rates, specific to the country of destination, were: 0.005
for Australia, 0.09 for Belgium, 0.035 for Canada, 0.06 for Denmark, 0.015 for France, 0.05 for Germany, 0.05
for Japan, 0.08 for Luxembourg, 0.02 for Netherlands, 0.12 for Norway, 0.04 for Sweden, 0.04 for Switzerland,
0.02 for the UK and 0.005 for the US.
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Tables and Figures: Main Text 
 
Table 1 
Destination country determinants of bilateral migration stocks: 
1980-2005 in 14 OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable in each regression is Ln(Immigrant Stockop+1)t. Each regression includes 14 destination country effects and 1825(=73X25) year by country of origin 
effects. The explanatory variables are all entered with one lag, unless otherwise specified. Income per person is measured in PPP US $ at 2000 prices. The observations are 
weighted by the destination country population to account for heteroskedasticity of the errors across destination countries and the standard errors are clustered by destination 
countries to account for correlation within those.  **,* imply significance at the 5, 10% level. 
Specification:  (1) 
Basic: 
Income in 
levels 
(2) 
Income in 
logarithms  
(3) 
Decomposition 
log(wage)-
log(employment 
rate) 
(4) 
Including 
country of 
destination 
controls 
(5) 
Income is lagged 
2 periods 
(6) 
Omitting 
UK 
(7) 
Omitting 
US 
 
Income per capita, 
destination 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.29** 
(0.10) 
 0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
Income per worker, 
destination 
  0.17** 
(0.08) 
    
Employment/population, 
destination 
  2.53** 
(0.93) 
    
Ln(population), 
destination 
   2.39 
(1.66) 
   
Gini,  
destination 
   -0.01 
(0.02) 
   
(Percentage of 
population between 15 
and 24), destination 
   0.002 
(0.02) 
   
Land Border -1.29 
(0.73) 
-1.29 
(0.73) 
-1.29 
(0.76) 
-1.39 
(0.73) 
-1.33 
(0.73) 
-1.66* 
(0.75) 
-1.29 
(0.73) 
Same Language 0.08 
(0.40) 
0.08 
(0.41) 
0.08 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(0.42) 
0.08 
(0.42) 
0.13 
(0.40) 
0.08 
(0.41) 
Colonial Ties 2.66** 
(0.42) 
2.65* 
(0.42) 
2.65* 
(0.42) 
2.66** 
(0.42) 
2.63** 
(0.33) 
2.04** 
(0.78) 
2.65** 
(0.42) 
Log(distance) -2.02 
(0.32) 
-2.02** 
(0.32) 
-2.04** 
(0.32) 
-2.02** 
(0.32) 
-2.03** 
(0.32) 
-2.14** 
(0.31) 
-2.02** 
(0.32) 
Observations 21,805 21,805 21,805 21,148 19,776 19,091 21,805 
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Table 2 
 Bilateral migration flows, income per capita and immigration laws 
1980-2005 in 14 OECD destination countries  
 
Note: Dependent variable Ln(Immigrant Flowop+1)t . All regressions include 14 receiving country fixed effects and 1825(=73X25) year-by-sending-country fixed effects. 
Regressions of Panel A include  border, common language, colonial ties dummies and log distance as bilateral controls while regressions of Panel B include a full set of 1022 
(=73X14) country-pair  fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the population of the receiving country. Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs are reported in 
parentheses. **,* imply significance at the 5, 10% level. 
 
 
Specification:  (1) 
Basic 
(2) 
Log income  
(3) 
Combining 
entry  and 
stay laws 
(4) 
Including other 
destination 
country controls 
(5) 
Immigration 
Laws lagged 2 
periods 
(6)  
Omitting the 
UK 
(7) 
Omitting the 
US 
Panel A: Including bilateral geographic characteristics to control for migration costs 
Income per capita, 
Destination 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.53** 
(0.25) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
Tightness  
of immigration entry laws 
-0.13** 
(0.02) 
-0.14** 
(0.03) 
-0.09** 
(0.03) 
-0.15** 
(0.03) 
-0.12** 
(0.03) 
-0.12** 
(0.03) 
-0.20** 
(0.04) 
Tightness  
of asylum laws 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
-0.14* 
(0.07) 
Maastricht 
 
0.15 
(0.63) 
0.14 
(0.63) 
0.18 
(0.53) 
0.19 
(0.64) 
0.03 
(0.61) 
-1.12 
(0.63) 
0.61 
(0.66) 
Schengen 
 
0.26 
(0.61) 
0.33 
(0.61) 
0.28 
(0.61) 
0.31 
(0.62) 
0.34 
(0.60) 
0.67 
(0.63) 
0.37 
(0.53) 
Panel B: Including the full set of origin-destination country pair dummies to control for pair-specific migration costs 
Income per capita 
Destination 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.77** 
(0.30) 
0.13** 
(0.03) 
0.11* 
(0.03) 
0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.13** 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.02) 
Tightness  
of immigration entry laws 
-0.10** 
(0.02) 
-0.08** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.017) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
Tightness  
of asylum laws 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.20** 
(0.07) 
-0.23** 
(0.07) 
-0.14* 
(0.07) 
-0.26** 
(0.07) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.20** 
(0.07) 
Maastricht 
 
1.09** 
(0.43) 
0.59** 
(0.18) 
0.72** 
(0.18) 
0.78** 
(0.17) 
0.60** 
(0.16) 
0.81** 
(0.15) 
0.77** 
(0.17) 
Schengen 
 
0.60** 
(0.33) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.26* 
(0.15) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
Observations 21,805 21,805 21,805 19,776 21,148 19,332 19,332 
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Table 3 
 Robustness checks: Effects of welfare and labor market laws on bilateral migration flows 
1980-2005 in 14 OECD destination countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dependent variable Ln(Immigrant Flowop+1)t . All regressions include 14 receiving country fixed effects and 1825(=73X25) year-by-sending-country fixed effects and  
border, common language, colonial ties dummies and log distance as bilateral controls. Observations are weighted by the population of the receiving country. Specification (1) uses 
median income in the destination country as explanatory variable. Specification (2) includes a measure of welfare spending per person in the destination country in constant PPP 
US $. These measures are limited to the period 1980-2000 and they are missing for some years and countries. Specification (3) includes a measure of how protective are 
employment laws and a measure of minimum wage relative to median wage. These measures are only available for the period 1980-2002 and missing for several years and 
countries. Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs are reported in parentheses. **,* imply significance at the 5, 10% level. 
Specification:  (1) 
Using Median 
income 
(2) 
Including 
total welfare 
spending per 
person   
(1980-2000) 
(3) 
Including labor 
market laws 
(1980-2000) 
Income per capita, 
Destination 
0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
Tightness  
of immigration entry laws 
-0.12** 
(0.03) 
-0.09** 
(0.02) 
-0.14** 
(0.03) 
Welfare spending per 
person 
 0.78** 
(0.16) 
 
Employment Protection 
Laws 
  -0.65** 
(0.27) 
Minimum wage (relative 
to median) 
  -3.46** 
(1.15) 
Observations 21747 15883 8673 
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Table 4 
 Impact of yearly immigrant flows on production factors, productivity and factors per worker:  
Yearly changes, OLS Estimates 
 
  
 
 
Note:  Each cell shows the coefficient from a different regression with the dependent variable described in the first cell of the row and the explanatory 
variable equal to the total flow of immigrants as a share of the initial population of the receiving country. The method of estimation is Least Squares. Each 
regression includes year fixed effects. The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by country. Specification (1) uses all 
the country-year observations, specification (2) omits the US data, specification (3) includes only the nine continental European countries in our sample; 
specification (4) uses only observations from the 1990-2005 period, specification (5) includes the lagged value of the level of the dependent variable as 
explanatory variable and specification (6) uses the “net” immigration flows, namely those obtained after subtracting the estimated re-migration from the 
existing stock of immigrants.  **,* imply significance at the 5, 10% level. 
  
 (1)  
basic OLS 
(2)  
Omitting US 
(3)  
Europe only 
(4) 
1990-2005 
(5) 
 including 
lagged levels 
(6)  
Using Net 
Immigration 
ΔL/L 0.95** 
(0.12) 
1.03** 
(0.08) 
1.06** 
(0.08) 
0.95** 
(0.17) 
1.09** 
(0.29) 
3.25** 
(0.32) 
ΔEmployment/ 
Employment 
0.99** 
(0.12) 
1.05** 
(0.08) 
1.09** 
(0.14) 
1.06** 
(0.23) 
1.30** 
(0.28) 
2.87** 
(0.35) 
ΔHours per worker 
/Hours per worker 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.11 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.36 
(0.24) 
ΔK/K 0.75** 
(0.27) 
0.84** 
(0.24) 
1.12** 
(0.20) 
1.04** 
(0.30) 
0.51** 
(0.19) 
1.77** 
(0.39) 
ΔA/A -0.06 
(0.31) 
-0.07 
(0.32) 
-0.06 
(0.32) 
-0.23 
(0.25) 
-0.01 
(0.32) 
-0.27 
(0.78) 
ΔY/Y 0.82** 
(0.41) 
0.87** 
(0.39) 
1.00** 
(0.40) 
0.73** 
(0.41) 
0.82* 
(0.45) 
2.48** 
(0.81) 
ΔCapital per worker/ 
Capital per worker 
-0.24 
(0.20) 
-0.20 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(0.38) 
-0.11 
(0.54) 
ΔOutput per hour/ 
Output per hour 
-0.13 
(0.37) 
-0.15 
(0.38) 
-0.05 
(0.35) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.06 
(0.36) 
-0.51 
(0.88) 
Observations 350 325 225 210 336 350 
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Table 5 
 First stage of the 2SLS:  
Dependent variable is the gross immigration flow predicted by push factors and bilateral fixed costs 
 
 
  
\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The dependent variable in all first stage regressions is the immigration rate measured as gross immigration flows relative to initial population. The 
explanatory variable (instrument) is the predicted immigration rate using the estimated values of Dot and Dod from the empirical equation (14). All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Specification (1) includes all countries and all years 1980-2005, specification (2) omits the US, specification (3) 
includes only the nine Continental European Countries (not the UK) and specification (4) considers only observations relative to the period 1990-2005.  In 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates we report heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by country. Below the F-statistics we report the 
probability of rejecting the inclusion of the instruments in the first stage.  **,* imply significance at the 5, 10% level. The third row reports the partial R-
square that measures the share of variance of the dependent variable accounted for by the instrument. 
   
 
 
 
 (1)  
Basic  
(2)  
Omitting US 
(3)  
Europe Only  
(4)  
1990-2005 
Coefficient 0.67** 
(0.03) 
0.67** 
(0.03) 
0.67** 
(0.04) 
0.62** 
(0.03) 
F-test 
(p-value) 
495.1** 
(0.000) 
496** 
(0.000) 
319.2** 
(0.000) 
539.14 
(0.000) 
Partial R-Square 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.41 
Observations 350 325 225 210 
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Table 6 
 Impact of yearly gross immigrant flows on production factors and productivity:  
2SLS estimates, instruments: gravity push-factors  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Each cell shows the coefficient from a different regression with the dependent variable described in the first cell of the row and the explanatory 
variable equal to the total flow of immigrants as a share of the initial population of the receiving country. The method of estimation is 2SLS using the 
predicted flow of immigrants from the gravity push factors as instruments. Each regression uses yearly differences by country and includes year fixed 
effects. The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by country. Specification (1) uses all the country-year observations, 
specification (2) omits the US data, specification (3) includes only the nine continental European countries in our sample; specification (4) uses only 
observations from the 1990-2005 period, specification (5) uses the “net” immigration flows, namely those obtained after subtracting the estimated re-
migration from the existing stock of immigrants.  **,* imply significance at the 5, 10% level. 
 
 
 
 (1)  
basic 2SLS 
(2)  
Omitting US 
(3)  
Europe only 
(4) 
1990-2005 
(5)  
Using Net 
Immigration 
ΔL/L 1.02** 
(0.12) 
0.99 
(0.08) 
1.00 
(0.08) 
0.96** 
(0.08) 
4.00** 
(0.29) 
ΔEmployment/ 
Employment 
1.22** 
(0.09) 
1.21** 
(0.10) 
1.22** 
(0.13) 
1.22** 
(0.12) 
4.81** 
(0.37) 
ΔHours per worker 
/Hours per worker 
-0.20* 
(0.10) 
-0.20 
(0.11) 
-0.25** 
(0.08) 
-0.26** 
(0.10) 
-0.80 
(0.45) 
ΔK/K 1.36** 
(0.17) 
1.37** 
(0.18) 
1.49** 
(0.20) 
1.38** 
(0.19) 
5.37** 
(0.52) 
ΔA/A -0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.14) 
-0.37 
(0.14) 
-0.51 
(0.67) 
ΔY/Y 0.99** 
(0.50) 
0.99** 
(0.17) 
1.09** 
(0.20) 
0.94** 
(0.17) 
3.91** 
(0.62) 
ΔCapital per worker/ 
Capital per worker 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.23 
(0.14) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.56 
(0.51) 
ΔOutput per hour/ 
Output per hour 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.17) 
-0.10 
(0.80) 
Observations 350 325 225 210 350 
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Table 7 
5-year differences 
2SLS estimates, instruments: gravity push factors only 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Each cell shows the coefficient from a different regression with the dependent variable described in the first cell of the row and the explanatory 
variable equal to the total flow of immigrants as a share of the initial population of the receiving country. The method of estimation is 2SLS using the 
predicted flow of immigrants from the gravity push factors as instruments. Each regression uses changes over five years between 1980 and 2005 and 
includes period fixed effects. The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by country.  **,* imply significance at the 5, 
10% level. 
 
 
 (1)  
basic 2SLS 
(2)  
Omitting US 
(3)  
Europe only 
(4) 
1990-2005 
ΔL/L 0.99** 
(0.09) 
0.97** 
(0.08) 
0.97** 
(0.10) 
0.97** 
(0.08) 
ΔEmployment/ 
Employment 
1.18** 
(0.09) 
1.16** 
(0.09) 
1.21** 
(0.10) 
1.18** 
(0.10) 
ΔHours per worker 
/Hours per worker 
-0.19 
(0.08) 
-0.19 
(0.09) 
-0.23** 
(0.06) 
-0.22** 
(0.10) 
ΔK/K 1.24** 
(0.13) 
1.25** 
(0.17) 
1.33** 
(0.18) 
1.22** 
(0.17) 
ΔA/A -0.09 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
ΔY/Y 0.96** 
(0.14) 
0.97** 
(0.16) 
1.05** 
(0.18) 
0.97** 
(0.15) 
ΔCapital per worker/ 
Capital per worker 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
ΔOutput per hour/ 
Output per hour 
-0.02 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
Observations 70 65 45 56 
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Table 8 
Impact of immigration in Normal and Bad economic times: Period 1980-2005 
2SLS estimates, instruments: gravity push factors only 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  The coefficients in the cell couples labeled “Normal times” and “Bad Times” for each dependent variable are from the same regression. The explanatory 
variable is the inflow of immigrants as percentage of initial population interacted with a dummy equal to one alternatively, when output gap is larger than -1% (normal 
times) or smaller than -1% (bad times)  The dependent variable is described in the first cell of the row. Specification (1) includes time fixed effects in each regression. 
Specification (2) includes time effects and lagged income per worker. The method of estimation is 2SLS using the predicted flow of immigrants from the gravity push 
factors as instruments, as described in the text. The standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by country.  **,* imply significance at the 
5, 10% level. 
Specification: (1) 
Basic 2SLS 
 
(2) 
2SLS  
Controlling for lagged income per worker 
 
Normal Times 
Output gap>-1% 
Bad Times: 
Output gap<-1% 
Normal Times 
Output gap>-1% 
Bad Times: 
Output gap<-1% 
ΔL/L 1.746** 
(0.175) 
0.520** 
(0.110) 
1.717** 
(0.116) 
0.498** 
(0.123) 
ΔEmployment/ 
Employment 
1.724** 
(0.159) 
0.883** 
(0.113) 
1.700** 
(0.156) 
0.866** 
(0.113) 
ΔHours per worker 
/Hours per worker 
0.022 
(0.0771) 
-0.364** 
(0.151) 
0.017 
(0.0884) 
-0.367** 
(0.153) 
ΔK/K 1.676** 
(0.205) 
1.158** 
(0.149) 
1.714** 
(0.257) 
1.185** 
(0.177) 
ΔA/A -0.189 
(0.156) 
-0.091 
(0.184) 
-0.167 
(0.182) 
-0.075 
(0.182) 
ΔY/Y 1.517** 
(0.141) 
0.634** 
(0.163) 
1.532** 
(0.156) 
0.645** 
(0.169) 
ΔCapital per worker/ 
Capital per worker 
-0.048 
(0.167) 
0.274** 
(0.125) 
0.0139 
(0.200) 
0.320** 
(0.148) 
ΔOutput per hour/ 
Output per hour 
-0.229 
(0.182) 
 
0.114 
(0.219) 
-0.185 
(0.178) 
0.147 
(0.224) 
Observations 336 298 
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Tables and Figures: Appendix 
 
Table A1: 
List of the countries of origin of migrants for the bilateral migration data
Countries of Origin 
Algeria Ghana Nigeria 
Australia Greece Norway 
Austria Guatemala Pakistan 
Bangladesh Guyana Peru 
Belgium Haiti Philippines 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Honduras Poland 
Brazil Hong Kong Portugal 
Bulgaria Hungary Romania 
Cambodia Iceland Russian Federation 
Canada India Slovenia 
Chile Iran Somalia 
China Iraq South Africa 
Colombia Ireland South Korea 
Croatia Italy Spain 
Cuba Jamaica Sri Lanka 
Cyprus Japan Suriname 
Denmark Kenya Sweden 
Dominican Republic Laos Thailand 
Ecuador Lebanon Tunisia 
El Salvador Malaysia Turkey 
Ethiopia Mexico UK 
Fiji Morocco USA 
Finland Netherlands Vietnam 
France New Zealand Zaire 
Germany Nicaragua  
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Table A2: 
Average values of the variables included in the regressions for bilateral flows; 
Separated between countries of origin and countries of destination, in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
Per Capita GDP, Employment Rate and Population (available 1980-2004): Penn World Table 6.2. PPP-converted, chain-weighted GDP per worker. 
Share of population 15 to 24 (available 1980-2004): United Nations population statistics. 
Inequality (Gini Coefficient), (available 1980-2004): World Income Inequality Database V2.0. available at 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/. We select only “high quality” observations (those ranked 1 and 2). If there are more 
than one value per country and year we average them.  The data are available to differing degrees across countries, but we linearly interpolated values to 
obtain values for intermediate years and we use the value in the closest (latest or earliest) available year to complete the series backwards (to 1980) and 
forward (to 2004). The 14 receiving OECD countries have a complete series 1980-2004. 
variable 1980 1990 2000 2004 
GDP per person 
Origin 
7,944 9,442 11,198 12,018 
GDP per person 
Destination 
17,979 21,916 28,565 29,022 
Employment rate 
Origin 
42% 44% 46% 47% 
Employment rate 
Destination 
47% 49% 50% 49% 
Gini 
Origin 
0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40 
Gini 
Destination 
0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Share of population 
between 14 and 24 
years, Origin 
9.2% 8.6% 8.82% 8.81% 
Share of population 
between 14 and 24 
years, Destination 
7.1% 6.1% 5.25% 5.99% 
Observations 
Origin 
77 77 77 77 
Observations 
Destination 
14 14 14 14 
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Table A3 
Annualized growth rates of inputs, productivity and output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The data were constructed by the authors using the OECD-STAN dataset and the PWT 6.2 data as 
sources. The exact definition of the variables and of the procedure to construct them is in the main text, 
section 5.2. 
      
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1980-1990 
Real GDP 14 2.72 0.79 1.99 4.83 
Total Hours worked 14 0.68 0.84 -0.50 1.78 
Employment 14 1.07 0.63 0.18 1.88 
Capital  Services 14 3.43 1.04 2.25 5.59 
Total Factor Productivity 14 1.14 0.71 -0.25 2.50 
1990-2000 
Real GDP 14 2.62 1.02 1.06 4.91 
Total Hours worked 14 0.58 0.96 -0.92 2.77 
Employment 14 0.92 0.97 -0.67 3.40 
Capital  Services 14 3.75 1.05 2.06 6.12 
Total Factor Productivity 14 1.01 0.65 -0.56 2.38 
2000-2005 
Real GDP 14 1.98 0.86 0.60 3.65 
Total Hours worked 14 0.34 0.84 -0.93 1.96 
Employment 14 0.73 0.97 -0.41 3.08 
Capital  Services 14 3.11 1.26 1.37 6.02 
Total Factor Productivity 14 0.73 0.54 0.17 1.79 
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Panel A1: Immigration flows relative to population; Gross and Net for 14 OECD Countries 
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Panel A2: Tightness of immigration reforms over time. 14 OECD countries 1980-2005 
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